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Introduction 
The literature dealing with the coordination of economic policies among countries or 
groups of countries in an integrated world stands out as one of the most prominent 
developments of the last few years. Although not the only one, a clear application of the results 
emerging from this literature is associated with the tax approximation efforts that have been 
carried out in the European Union, and, without any doubt, the above-mentioned development 
cannot be understood without a reference to these real world events. One of the issues most 
actively researched has probably been that of indirect taxation, stimulated by the European 
Comission proposals aimed at harmonizing valué added taxes and excises. In particular, some 
questions related to tax competition have been analyzed in different contexts [Mintz and Tulkens 
(1986), de Crombrugghe and Tulkens (1990), Sinn (1990), Lockwood (1993), Kanbur and 
Keen (1993)] as well as the welfare effects of indirect tax harmonization policies [Keen 
(1987,1989.a,1989.b), Turunen-Red and Woodland (1991), Keen and Lahiri (1993)]. 
The framework for the analysis of the impact of harmonizing reforms has been the 
destination principie, i.e., the principie that internationally traded commodities are taxed at the 
rates of (and the revenue accrues to) the country in which final consumption takes place. The 
alternative to the destination principie is the origin, or source, principie, under which 
commodities entering intemational trade are taxed at the rates prevailing in the country where 
they are produced (this being the one which collects the revenue). Although the destination 
principie has been the central idea governing the harmonizing efforts of indirect taxation that 
have been carried out by the European Comission, the abolition of border controls has rendered 
it unsustainable. The definitive system, to be enacted at the start of 1997, maintains the 
destination system for transactions between firms but cross-border purchases by individuáis 
will be taxed on an origin basis, thus appearing as a mixed system. 
The purpose of this paper is to establish a parallelism between the analyses in Keen 
(1987,1989.a) referred to indirect tax harmonization when taxes are levied according to the 
destination principie and its counterpart when taxes are imposed on an origin basis. Using a 
simple two-country model of intemational trade it is argued that indirect tax harmonization 
under the origin principie, considered as a movement of domestic taxes towards an 
appropriately designed "average" tax structure, is potentially Pareto improving, in the sense that 
the welfare of a given country can be increased provided that the other country's welfare is kept 
unchanged with the aid of an intemational transfer. In the same vein, it is shown that if the 
initial position is a Nash equilibrium, there are situations under which the above-mentioned 
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reform may genérate an actual Pareto improvement, so that both countries improve their welfare 
without any need for a compensating intemational transfer. 
As stated above, the definitive system will be a mixed one, so that the puré origin case is 
not the most realistic framework from a policy point of view. However, it may be useful in 
yielding indications that, coupled with the results that have been obtained under the destination 
principie, provide insights on the effects of the definitive system. In the same way as Keen 
(1987,1989.a) constructs his harmonizing reform under the destination principie in such a way 
that (neglecting income effects) world producer prices are unchanged, the counterpart of his 
analysis under the origin principie does not affect world consumer prices. This paralellism 
translates into modifying the common target towards which countries harmonize their indirect 
tax structures, which does not depend on local demand responses but on local supply 
responses. The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 1 the basic model is set up. 
Section 2 considere tax harmonization as a potential Pareto improvement. Section 3 poses the 
question whether the specific kind of harmonizing reform being analyzed can also result in an 
actual Pareto improvement. Section 4 includes some additional comments. 
1. The model 
The basic framework is a standard model of intemational trade [Dixit and Norman 
(1980)] in which two countries, labelled as "home" and "abroad", trade in N commodities. 
Each country's variables are represented by lower case and upper case letters respectively, and 
there is a single consumer in each of them. The only distortions are due to consumption taxes, 
levied on an origin basis, so that commodities are taxed at the rates prevailing in the country in 
which they are produced, this being the country which collects the tax revenue. Since, 
assuming away transport costs, the application of the origin principie implies that consumer 
prices in each country are the same, we have the following relationship between consumer 
prices, q-Q, producer prices in each country, p and P, and the tax instruments, t and T: 
[1] P = q-t P=q-T 
where taxes are expressed in specific terms.1 
1 Since the application of the origin principie implies that exports are taxed and imports are exempted, the home 
(abroad) country's consumer must be indifferent, in equilibrium, between payingp + t (P + T) for domestically-
produced goodsand P + T (p + t) for imported goods. Thus, consumer prices are equalized across countries, i.e., 
q = Q. On the working and consequences of the origin principie see Cnossen and Shoup (1987) and Keen 
(1990,1993). 
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The home and foreign consumers can be characterized by their expenditure functions, 
e{q,ü) and E(q, U), where u and U stand for the utility levéis achieved by the consumer in each 
country. Tax revenue is returned to the individuáis as a lump sum payment. As for the 
production side, it is assumed that both countries behave competitively, and their behaviour can 
be resumed in the revenue functions r(p) and R(P).2 
Since the partial derivatives of the expenditure and revenue functions yield, respectively, 
the compensated demand and supply functions, the world market-clearing conditions for the N 
commodities are given by: 
[2] e¿q,u) + E¿q, U) = rp(p) + Rp(P) 
where the subindices denote the (vector of) partial derivatives of the relevant functions. 
Consumer expenditure in each country equals national income at domestic prices plus 
tax revenue. Using the sign' to denote transposition, the budget constraints in each country can 
be written as: 
[3] e(q,u) = r(p) + t' rp(p) + qxz 
[4] E(q,U) = R(P) + T'RfiP)-qlz 
where t' rp(p) and T' Rf(P) express tax revenue in each country. The term z represents a 
transfer of commodity 1 from the foreign country to the home one. Its purpose is to characterize 
reforms entailing a potential Pareto improvement, in the sense that u can be increased for a 
given valué of U. The role of z is just that of assuring that the foreign utility level does not 
change. On the other hand, z = 0 in [3] and [4] when the focus is on characterizing an actual 
Pareto improvement, i.e., a situation in which both « and U increase without any need for an 
intemational transfer. 
As a matterof normalization, commodity 1 is taken to be the numeraire (so q\ = 1) and 
is assumed to be untaxed in both countries (i.e., t\ = T\ = 0). In order to avoid excessive 
notation, vector prices will hereafter be interpreted as being oiN-\ dimensión. By Walras' Law 
one of the N+2 equations in [2]-[4] can be dropped, so we can drop the equilibrium condition 
for commodity 1. Therefore the system in [2]-[4] can be described as N+l independent 
equations with N+l variables. In the search for a potential Pareto improvement the latter are 
N-l relative consumer prices, q, the home utility level, u, and the size of the intemational 
2 The revenue (or GNP) function, expressing the valué of production at given producer prices (and amounts of 
the primary factors), is extensively discussed in Dixit and Norman (1980, ch. 2). 
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transfer, z, given the tax parameters t and T as well as the foreign utility level, U. Alternatively, 
in the search for an actual Pareto improvement the N+l variables are q, u and U and the 
parameters are / and T. 
2. Tax Harmonization as a Potential Pareto Improvement 
Consider first tax harmonization as a potential Pareto improvement, so that the policy 
leads to an increase in one country's welfare when it is accompanied by an appropriate 
intemational transfer to the other country so that its welfare level is kept constant. We can thus 
evalúate in [2]-[4] the welfare effects in terms of the home country's welfare, du, of an 
arbitrary tax reform, {dt,dT}, coupled with the transfer, dz, required to hold U unchanged. 
Differentiating in [2]-[4] with dU = 0, we have: 
[ 5 ] eq/iu + [eqj + ECfí- rpp - Rpp]dq + rppdt + RPPdT = 0N.i 
[6] e,¿lu+[eq-rp-rpptydq + t'rppdt-dz = 0 
[7] [Eq-Rp-RPPT],dq+T'Rppdr+dz = 0 
where is the (N-1)-vector of zeroes. Thus, eliminating dz in [6] and [7]: 
du] = \-(t'rppdt+T'RPPdT) • 
dq\ [ -{rppdt + RppdT) 
where A = + Egj - rpp - Rpp, i.e, the matrix of the derivatives of the compensated world 
excess demand for the non-numeraire goods with respect to the non-numeraire prices, is 
negative semi-definite. It will be assumed throughout that there is enough substitutability in 
demand or production between the numeraire good and the other goods to ensure that A will be 
negative definite.3 
The system in [8] allows one to obtain an expression for the change in home utility, du, 
as a function of the reform associated with dt and dT: 
-{t' rppdt + T' RppdT) -(rppt + RPPT)' 
-(rppdt+ RppdT) A 
where: 
3 See Dixit and Norman (1980, ch. 5). 
[8] 
-(rppt+RPPT)' 
'qu 
[9] du -
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[10] a = eu + (rppt + RPPT) 'A^e^ 
and it can be shown thata is positive whenever an increase in the home country's endowment 
of the first commodity, at constant tax rates and foreign utility, implies a strict potential Pareto 
improvement. We will assume this is the case. 
The notion of harmonization is usually taken to mean making the tax systems more 
"uniform". This entails both a process of convergence towards a common target and the 
suggestion of determining this target as some kind of average of the existing tax structures. The 
first question can be approached as a program of domestic tax reforms implying a uniform 
proportionate convergence of the tax rates in both countries towards a certain common structure 
H , i.e.: 
where H is a N-l vector and /3 is a small positive scalar which measures the "size" of the 
reform. As for the second question, i.e., the choice of the common target to which both 
countries "harmonize" their taxes, the counterpart of the proposition shown in Keen (1987) 
refers to the particular class or harmonizing reforms [11] which imply a convergence towards 
the vector 
The interpretation of [12] becomes clearer when it is rewritten as: 
[13] H=<Pt+(INA-<P)T 
where <P = [rpp + Rpp]'lrpp and is the identity matrix of order N-l, so that (Ip¡_i - <P) = 
[rpp + RpP]'1Rpp. As shown in [13], H i s a matrix weighted average of the tax structures in the 
two countries where the weights depend on local supply responses. In particular, i f these local 
supply responses are identical at the starting position, i.e., rpp = RPp, [13] becomes 
H = (l/2)(í+7), and each component of H i s located just midway between the corresponding 
components of the initial domestic tax structures t and T. 
Now we can show that the harmonizing reform under examination leads to a welfare 
improvement: 
[11] 
[12] H= [rpp + RppY\rppt + RPPT) 
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Proposition 1: When taxes are levied according to the origin principie, and given any 
arbitrary initialpositionin which t * T, the harmonizing reform in [ 1 1 ] - [ 1 3 ] , consisting in a 
proportionate convergence towards an appropriate weighted average ofthe existing domestic 
tax structures, generales a potential Pareto improvement. 
Proof. The proof runs parallel to that of Keen ( 1 9 8 7 ) and hinges on the fact that [ 1 1 ] - [ 1 3 ] 
imply: 
[ 1 4 ] rppdt+ RppdT = OAM 
whose substitution in [ 9 ] gives rise to: 
[ 1 5 ] du= ±(t'rpPdt+T'RppdT) = ^-{T-tyRPp$(T-t)>0 
where the inequality follows from the fact that the matrix Rpp<P= Rpf[rpp + Rpp'\1rpp = 
Tpi + Rpp}1 is positive definite. Q.E.D. 
Some intuition on the result can be obtained if we neglect income effects for the non-
numerarie goods, i.e., i f e^ = 0p¡.\. Substituting in [ 8 ] and using [ 1 4 ] provides dq- OJV-I, so 
that world consumer prices do not vary. Therefore, the harmonizing reform is designed to leave 
consumer prices unchanged. As a consequence, world demand, e¿fq,u) + E<fq,U), wi l l not 
change, as neither wil l world supply, rp(p) + Rp(P). The only effect of the policy is the 
"reallocation" of production between countries so that the aggregate welfare loss from distorting 
taxes is decreased. 
A graphical explanation is provided in Figure l . 4 It shows the simplified case in which 
the two countries have the same supply schedule for a single taxed good whose consumer 
world price is q. The excess burden associated with the taxes t and T in each country is given 
by A B C in country 1 and A D E in country 2 . In this case in which supply responses are the 
same, if the two countries harmonize their taxes at the level ( 1 / 2 ) (t + T) implied by [ 1 2 ] , the 
reduction in excess burden in the high-tax country is B C F G , which exceeds the increase in the 
low-tax country, D E F G . Since the distances y ¿y and y\y are the same, aggregate supply does 
not vary. Provided the appropriate intemational transfer is made, one country can improve 
without the other one experiencing any welfare change. 
Figure 1 is the eounterpart in the present context of the analysis of harmonization under the destination 
principie in Keen (1990,1993). I am indebted to Ben Lockwood for suggesting this diagram in his discussion of 
the paper at the Copenhagen meeting of the HCM research network on "Fiscal Implications of European 
Integration". 
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3. Tax Harmonization as an Actual Pareto Improvement 
While the previous section has argued that the harmonizing reform [11]-[13] is welfare 
improving in the sense that it increases the utility level of a country provided the other country's 
welfare is kept unchanged, the question that arises is whether this reform may also imply an 
actual Pareto improvement, i.e., a gain in both countries' utility without any need for an 
intemational compensation. This is the question discussed in Keen (1989.a) when taxes are 
levied according to the destination principie under the assumption that the are no income effects 
for the N-l taxed commodities (i.e., — Equ - 0#_i in terms of the present model). 
The analysis can now be carried out forcing z = 0 in [2]-[4] and interpreting the N+l 
variables as N-l consumer prices, q, and two utility levéis, u and U, for given valúes of the tax 
parameters t and T. Differentiating totally we obtain: 
[16] e^/iu + EqUdU + Adq + rppdt + RppdT = Oy.i 
[17] eudu + [eq- rp - rppt]'dq + t'rppdt = 0 
[18] EudU+[Eq-Rp-RpPT]'dq+T'RppdT =0 
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Using [16] to isolate dq, the effects on welfare, du and dU, associated with an arbitrary 
reform {dt,dT} are the solution to the system: 5 
[19] 
c« - (eq - rp - rppt) 'A' eq4 - {eq - rp - rppf) 'A EqU 
- {Eq-RP- RppT)'A'Xeqi Ev-(Eq-RP-RPPT)'A'lEqU_ 
\ d U } = L dU i 
- t' rppdt + (eq - rp - rppf) 'A' (rppdt + RppdT) 
T'RppdT +{Eq-Rp- RppT)'A~\rppdt + RppdT) _ 
We can now assume, as in Keen (1989.a), that there are no income effects for the N-l 
taxed goods, i.e.: 
[20] Zqu = Equ=0fí-l 
so that all income effects are through the untaxed numeraire. This allows one to rewrite [19] as: 
{eq-rp-rpptyAA 
[21] eju 
EudU 
t' +(eq-rp-rppt)'A~ 
(Eq-Rp-RpPT)'A 
1 T' +{Eq-Rp-RPPT)'A 
rppdt 
RppdT 
Solvins for du we obtain: 
[22] du = M[t' - (eq - rp - rppt)']AArppdt - (eq - rp - rppt) 'A'lRPPdT} 
and a similar expression for dU. Focusing on the harmonizing reforms [11]-[13], and recalling 
that they imply rppdt + RppdT = 0#-i, [22] becomes: 
[23] du= —{t'St -t'ST) 
5 In the particular case of the harmonizing reforms [11]-[13], and using [14], the right hand side in [19] becomes 
- í 'rppdt , - T'RppdT'] ' - We can observe that adding the expressions for du and dU in [19] we fmd a weighted 
sum of the welfare changes experienced by both countries: 
[eu + {rppt + RppT)'Aleq^du + [Ev + (rppt + RPPT)'A'X Eqjj\dU - - (í 'rppdt + T 'RppdT) > 0 
where the weights are a (> 0) in [10] and its counterpart A (> 0) for the foreign country. Since this is positive 
using the right hand side in [15], the harmonizing reform [11]-[13] is welfare-enhancing in the sense that it 
increases the valué of a social welfare function W = au + AU, i.e., an additive measure of world welfare where 
the weigths attached to each country are a and A. Actually, this result is not surprising when compared to that 
in section 2, and the procedure in that section has the advantage of focusing on the role of the intemational 
transfer dz required for du to be positive for a given valué of U. 
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where S = rpp(IN.i - <P) = rpf¿pp + R P P J RPP is a positive definite matrix, and, as before, 1N.\ 
is the identity matrix of order N-l. The first term in braces in the right of hand side of [23] is 
positive. However, the sign of t'ST is, in general, indeterminate. Using Keen's (1989.a) 
examples, if T = -t then t' ST = -t' St < 0, and the whole expression in [23] would be positive; 
but i f T = (l+<p)t, with <j> > 0, then t'ST = (1+0'St> 0, and [23] would be negative. In 
general, therefore, the sign of du (and dU) when the harmonizing reform [11]-[13] is 
undertaken will be uncertain. 
Since the term t'ST is the reason for the indeterminacy, we can search for situations in 
which t'ST < 0, and thus du > 0. The procedure followed by Keen (1989.a) is to take as a 
starting point a Nash equilibrium in which the tax structure in each country maximizes its own 
welfare given the choice of the other one, and we will also take this approach. For the home 
country this entails considering dT = 0y_i in [21], and there will exist reforms which the home 
country will consider as desirable and believe to be feasible except when: 
[24] t' - (eq - rp - rppt) 'A'1 = 0N.i 
Using [24] and its counterpart for the foreign country, Nash-equilibrium taxes í#and Tjq verify: 
[25] t N = ^ p p + ^ l < < e q ' T p ) 
TN=[RPP+A]\Eq-Rp) 
so that: 
[26] (tN)'S(TN) = -y'My 
where y - (eq - rp) = - (Eq - RP) denotes the vector of imports (exports) by the home (foreign) 
country and M=[e^ +Eqj-RPP'\1S[e{f} +E^-r^1. We can now ask about sufficient 
conditions for [26] to be negative, so that du in [23] is unambiguously positive. The following 
result is parallel to that in Keen (1989.a): 
Proposition 2: Starting from a Nash equilibrium, the harmonizing tax reform [11]-[13] 
generales an actual Pareto improvement, so that both du and dU are positive without any need 
for an intemational compensation, ifeither (i) there are no cross effects in consumption or 
production, or (ii) local supply responses are idéntica! at the initial position, in the sense that the 
equality rpp{p) - Rpp{P) holds. 
Proof. We have only to show that (tN) 'S(TN) in [26] is negative at a Nash equilibrium, which 
amounts to show that M in that expression is a positive definite matrix. In case (i) M is nothing 
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but the product of two diagonal negative definite matrices and a diagonal positive one, so that 
the elements M¿¡ of the principal diagonal are positive. In case (ii) the positive definiteness of M 
follows directly from that of S. Notice that in case (ii) [12] entails that the vector H towards 
which both countries' tax structures converge is given by H=(\l2)(t +T).6 Q.E.D. 
4. Concluding Comments 
The purpose of this paper has been to verify whether some reasonable conjectures 
concerning the welfare effects of certain indirect tax harmonizing policies actually hold. These 
conjectures arise when a parallelism between the destination and the origin (or source) 
principies is established in the framework of a standard general equilibrium model of 
intemational trade. The analysis suggests that some results that have been reported in the 
literature with respect to the effects of indirect tax harmonization when taxes are levied on a 
destination basis can be extended to its counterpart under the origin principie. 
In particular, under "normal" circumstances, there exist harmonizing reforms that 
genérate a potential Pareto improvement provided that they are supplemented with the 
appropriate intemational transfer(s). Furthermore, when the starting point is a Nash equilibrium 
at which each country sets its own taxes under the belief that the other(s) will not react, there 
are "exceptional" situations under which the above-mentioned reforms are also actually Pareto 
improving, so that each country benefits without any need for an intemational compensation. 
Two final remarks are in order. The first one is related to the fact that frameworks 
different from the one adopted in this paper yield very different results. In particular, in both de 
Crombrugghe and Tulkens (1990) [building on Mintz and Tulkens (1986)] and Kanbur and 
Keen (1993), when the starting point is a Nash equilibrium, a strict Pareto improvement is only 
possible if both countries increase their taxes, thus implying that a "harmonizing" reform cannot 
increase both countries' welfare. The second one refers to the limitations of the model itself. 
These are the same as those that have been pointed out concerning the analyses of the 
destination principie, and the absence of an explicit consideration of the distributional and 
budgetary effects of the harmonizing reforms stands out as one of the potential shortcomings of 
the whole approach [Keen (1990,1993)]. 
6 This implies that the situation in figure 1 should not only illustrate tax harmonization as a potential but also 
as an actual Pareto improvement. The failure of the diagram to refiect the latter is a consequence of its partial 
equilibrium nature. 
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As for the latter, we have assumed that the revenue from taxation is returned to the 
consumere as a lump-sum transfer and no attention has been paid paid to the effects associated 
with the governments having binding revenue requirements or providing public goods. This is 
important because both in Keen's (1987,1989.a) model and in the present one the optimal 
commodity taxes are always zero, in sharp contrast with the above-mentioned literature on tax 
competition, which allow for positive government expenditure which is optimally determined. 
Recent papers by Lockwood (1995), Delipalla (1994) and Lahiri and Raimondos (1995) 
discuss the effects of undertaking harmonizing reforms in the presence of (local) public goods 
provisión under the destination principie in different models. The last two of them are the 
closest to the present analysis. Although there are important differences in their frameworks,7 
both suggest that even when the governments use tax revenue to finance the provisión of public 
goods there may continué to be a welfare case for tax harmonization. In the same way as we 
have advanced a paralellism between destination and origin principies in a simple model that 
sidesteps the financing of public goods, it may well be the case that their results, obtained when 
taxes are levied on an destination basis, can also be extended to its counterpart under the origin 
principie. In any case, it seems fair to say that more research on the subject is warranted. 
7 On the one hand, Delipalla (1994) assumes that the public good is internationally tiaded and both transfers 
between individuáis and between governments are considered. On the other hand, the public good is domestically 
produced in Lahiri and Raimondos (1995) and only transfers between governments are allowed. Furthermore, 
Delipalla focuses on Keen's (1987,1989.a) rule of tax harmonization, while Lahiri and Raimondos analyze not 
only this rule but also one of their own. 
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